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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

WILLIAM PATTON

:

Case No. 970489-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

:

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Defendant was afforded sufficient discovery?

2.

Whether testimony of alleged ^surprise witness' had a

prejudicial impact on Appellant?
Both issues presented in this case represent mixed questions
of law and fact. As such, there are two applicable standards of
review.

The first is applied to factual findings and the other

to conclusions of law.

As to factual determinations, the

standard of review is one of clear error.

State v. Case, 884

P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
1

932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).

Conclusions of law, on the other hand
See State v. Ramirez, N817 P.2d 774

are reviewed for correctness.
(Utah 1991).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Provo City Code § 14.34.080(3).
No trash, used materials, junk, household
furniture, appliances, scrap material, equipment or
parts thereof shall be stored in an open area. The
accumulation of more than one (1) such item constitutes
a junk yard as defined in chapter 14.06, Provo City
Code and must be removed from the property, stored
within an enclosed building, or be properly located in
an M-2 zone.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant William Patton and co-defendant, Joan Patton were
served with summons on May 31, 1996, charging that on March 19,
1996, both defendants were in violation of Provo City Code
§14.34.080, a Class B misdemeanor.

On May 19, 1997, a bench

trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott resulted in the
conviction of both defendants.
23, 1997.

Defendants were sentenced on June

Joan Patton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth

District Court the same day.

On July 23, 1997, William Patton

also filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court,
commencing this action.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In November of 1995, Anthony Malloy came to work for Provo
City as a zoning enforcement officer (Tr. at 7).

Officer Malloy

is assigned to a specific geographic area of Provo City (Tr. at
2

8).

When officer Malloy was assigned to his area, he

was given

all the open files within that area (Tr. 8). Aside from clearing
up the violations in the continuing files, officer Malloy is
charged with addressing citizen complaints regarding zoning
violations in his area (Tr. at 8) .
One of the open files given to officer Malloy concerned
Defendants' property (Tr. at 8). Defendants' have a history of
zoning violations based on convictions for zoning violations in
both 1990 and 1993 by two different judges (Sentencing Transcript
at 8-9). In 1995, Provo City filed an order to show cause based
on a continuing problem (Sentencing Transcript at 9-10).
However, the notice was not filed in a timely manner and the
Court's jurisdiction to extend Defendants' probation expired at
the end of that year (Id). At this point, Officer Malloy was
given the file and instructed to verify whether a continuing
violation existed (Tr. at 8) .
On or about February 23, 1996, officer Malloy visited
defendants' property and confirmed the continuing existence of
junk, trash, and other materials in the yard, in violation of
Provo City Code §14-34-080 (Tr. at 8-9). Because defendants have
a sign on their fence warning all local and federal agents to
stay off the property, no personal contact was made with
defendants (Tr. at 10). Instead, a letter was sent to defendants
on February 23, 1996, requesting that they contact the zoning
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office in order that compliance might be obtained (Tr. at 9-10).
On March 11, 1996, in response to the above letter, officer
Malloy received a correspondence from defendant Joan Patton (Tr.
at 13). While different issues were addressed in the letter,
there was never an expression of willingness to comply with the
zoning ordinance.

A second notice to comply was sent to

Defendants the same day (Tr. at 12). This time Defendants failed
to respond altogether (Id). On March 19, 1996, officer Malloy
returned to Defendants' residence to confirm the continued
existence of the violation (Id). During this visit, officer
Malloy was accompanied by another zoning officer, Roger Gonzalez.
Officer Gonzalez took several photographs of Defendants' yard for
the purpose of documenting the zoning violation (Id).
At trial, Defendants objected to the testimony of officer
Gonzalez.

According to testimony by Joan Patton, "I did not

receive any discovery that Mr. Gonzalez was going to be a
witness, therefore I have not had a chance to prepare" (Tr. at
63).

All discovery in this case was conducted informally (Tr. at

65).

At trial, Gary McGinn, attorney for Provo City, stated:
Joan Patton has come into my office several
times. Our office has an open file policy. I
believe Mr. Humiston, I believe also, has come in
and asked for discovery. In our office if — and
to show them, in our file — if they come in we'll
allow them to look at the file, or we just make
copies of everything that's in the file. We give
everybody everything, there should be no secrets,
that's our office policy and that's what we do.
With that, I know as Joan Patton has come in
4

several times, we do have a cover sheet. It has a
list of our officers that says, "Anthony Kalloy,
Roger Gonzalez from the zoning department." Any
time they come in and take a look that's thfere...
(Tr. at 64) .
The Court denied the objection and allowed the testimony of
officer Gonzalez (Tr. at 66). At the end of the trial,
Defendants were convicted for violation of Provo City Code §
14.34.080(3).

The Court described the basis of its decision in

the following language:
In reading the statute and hearing the
testimony that's been provided by Mr. Malloy and
Mr. Gonzalez, which is the testimony we have, and
the testimony of Mr. Keller that we had a rather
dilapidated neighborhood in which the defendants'
property complied in making it appear to be the
same as the neighborhood in question, I find that
the City has met its burden of proof concerning
the second portion of that charging information in
Count I, therefore I find the defendants guilty as
charged.
From the plain and simple meaning of the
ordinance, so you have your record on appeal,
folks, I believe that the evidence has
sufficiently demonstrated that there are items
which consist of junk, stored trash, scraps of
wood, deteriorated cardboard boxes, and even
potential food products that looked like they had
gone bad, from the witnesses testimony.
And with that testimony being the only
testimony on the record, with nothing else to
rebut it or to describe what it was, then the
Court has only one conclusion to draw, and that is
is it believable or is it not, and I find that the
City has met its proof with respect to belief.
(Tr. at 115-116).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
T:.e

^
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illegal storage of
§ ] 4 34.080(3)
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violation of Provo Ciry Code

Defendants were afforded proper discovery in

accordance with Plaintiff's standard open-file policy.

Assuming

arguendo that Plaintiff did fail to provide sufficient discovery,
testimony from the alleged

{

surprise

•=• s s •

1 ia• :i i : : pi: ejudicia 1

impact on Defendant.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DIE NOT ERR, IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF ILLECV T.
STORAGE OF JUNK

Defendant was afforded proper discovery in accordance Plaintiff's open file pol icy
Requests for discovery are governed by by Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

According

. .. - -

must, upon request, disclose to the defendant "material or
informati : -i i : f i i 1 :i :i cl :i 1 le I las ] :i 101 i] edge" e s t : ai i] ,

:i tern : f

evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be
made ava :i ] abJ e t : tl le defendant in order for the defendant LO
adequately prepare his defense"

{Id.).

In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), the
Supreme Court of Utal I held that the prosecution must respond to
discovery requests in a manner which is not misleading.
tc • a c I: l i e v e tl l i s ei I :i,

order

tl i€ • C : i :i r t a :i : t:i c u l a t e d t ; : :i : eqi i :i i: eint . .

the prosecution must meet in responding to requests for

, at

discovery:
First, the prosecution either must produce ,all of
the material requested or must identify explicitly
those portions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material
requested, it must continue to disclose such material
on an ongoing basis to the defense.
Id.

In this case, the gravamen of Defendants' appeal is based on
a claim that Provo City failed to provide sufficient discovery.
Specifically, it is claimed that Plaintiff failed to provide
Defendants with a witness list.

The trial court rejected this

claim due to the fact that the record contained no request for
the identification of witnesses (Tr. at 65-66).

Defendants

concede that "the entire discovery process has been handled very
informally'' (Sentencing Transcript at 3) .
This informality is an enormous benefit to defendants who
are not currently required to petition the court or make formal
written discovery requests to the City.

Clearly, a more formal

discovery process would inoculate the City from charges like
those now brought by Defendants.

Nevertheless, defendants, often

appearing pro se, would hardly be served by the adoption of an
oppressively formal discovery policy.

In fact, under the City's

current open-file policy, defendants have full access to all of
the information possessed by the prosecution (Tr. at 64).
In this case, both defendant Joan Patton and Michael

7

Humiston, attorney for defendant William Patton, took the
o p p o r t.un i i ', ' 11

q ri a i nt i f fr s office to review ,the file.

'i si I

The file contains the charging information as well as a cover
sheet entitled Provo
Sheet.

Attorneyfs

City

Office Criminal Information

This sheet has a heading entitled Witnesses

Under that heading, the following is written:
(zoning)

and Roger

Gonzalez

(zoning).

(cmcers)

Anthony

.

Malloy

(Tr. at 64).

At trial, Defendant's attorney asserted the following:
"[E]very document 11. :;ns i-L^e was prcviaec • n IHP in c^^:c\ery
except the one that '-'r. McGinn is referring *
fllSL ' ' ' '

:

5 the

.. : - :

•.. I tt G

t h i s c l a i m , t h e cover s h e e t iri q u e s t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n in t h e
f -

1 1 ] f c .• :: t:

documents.

" -r

Only intentional removal oy trie City Attorneys office

woi lid explain the absence of the cover sheet.

T

i

"\^ areater

possibility is simple oversight on the part of jetencants and
their counsel.
Even defendanL J^an rd., :.

__

subterfuge on the part of the City:

-j- J- -- . u personally did not feel

nor do I believe thai the oversight was intention on the pari of
the Provo City prosecutor" (Sentencing Transcript at 5 ) .
Assuming arguendo that the cover sheet was mysteriously absent on
those occasions in wllich defendants reviewed the file, there ~s

HI

also mention of officer Gonzalez in another of the file's
documents.
In a memorandum dated March 20, 1996 (from officer Molloy to
Gary McGinn), officer Molloy states the following: "March 19,
1996, I went with Roger Gonzalez to the site and took the
attached photos."

Like the cover sheet, this memorandum was also

a part of Defendant's file.

This memorandum clearly indicates

that officer Molloy was accompanied by officer Gonzalez to the

specific

property

violation

in question

was charged.

on the day for which the

zoning

Based on the informal nature of the

discovery process, such a document alone should adequately place
a defendant on notice.

Interestingly, Defendants have failed to

allege the absence of this

document from the file to which they

were given full access.
Defendants have simply failed to show that Provo City was
derelict in its duty to provide reasonable discovery.

In short,

by giving Defendants unlimited access to the entire file,
Plainitiffs fulfilled their duty to provide all materials
requested.

Pursuant to Plaintiff's standard open-file policy,

Defendants were placed on notice that officer Gonzalez was a
listed witness. Defendants have simply failed to establish that
they were intentionally misled at any point during the discovery
process.
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Testimony of allege
impact

rprise

il i ."/ had no prejudicial.

on Defendant

Even assuming arguendo that Provo City failed to"
provide adequate discco v e i: ^ , I) e f e i 1 d a i i t: s 1 i a \ e f a I ] e :I I: :
demonstrate that the introduction of testimony b y officer
G on z a 1 e z

i a s ]:: :i : • = • j i i ::l :i • : :i a 3

I: : 1 1 I = :i 3 : • : a s • • =

R i I 1 e 3 0 (a ! : • f 1:1 : € I J

Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Any error, defect,
irreaul ari •--- or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.' 7
Thus, the Court must engage i^ ~ two-prong analysis

_i st,

it must determine whether the ^ i ^ a officer Gonzalez's testimony.

Only upon an affirmative response
' , o ??

t' : • 1:1 le abo v e • 31 ]'t;st i H I I ,
C o u r t finds t h e trial court w a s m
whet1"-

l

error,

* e

~r\:s: • .e:. d e t e r m i n e

MI WH, suffi "*: c-rr "•* rrr^udiciai Lu warrant

reversal.

State v. Carter,

,-/ ;;.2a 656, 662 (Utah 1985).

The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following:
We have ruled in several cases that the Rule
30 phrase "affect the substantial rights of a
party" means that an error warrants reversal "only
if a review of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was a
reasonable

likelihood
of a more favorable
defendant."

result

for

the

State v. KnigixL, .J,^ > .^d 913, 919 (Utah 198 ?) (citing State v.
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis a d d e d ) ) .
A

^reasonable likelihood' is only achieved when

M

the

likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to

undermine our confidence in the verdict."

Horrel v. Utah Farm

Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1996), (quoting
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).
Even without officer Gonzalez's testimony, it is clear that
defendants would have nevertheless been convicted in this case.
Defendants baldly assert that "all other evidence other than
Mr. Gonzales' testimony was disregarded by the judge"
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This statement is demonstrably false.
In convicting Defendants, the trial judge specifically relied
upon the testimony of all three witnesses, not just officer
Gonzalez (Tr. at 115-116).
Next, Defendants assert the following: "The court found only
that there was trash, specifically firewood, in the yard, and
this was a matter that only Mr. Gonzales had testified to"
(Defendants' Brief at 12). Again, this assertion is demonstrably
false.

To begin, the Court never found that firewood

on the property.

was present

Rather, the court determined that scraps

wood were found on the property.

of

(Tr. at 116).

Further, Defendants' claim that Mr. Gonzalez was the only
person to testify concerning scrap wood in the yard is also
demonstrably false. At various points during the trial, officer
Molloy also testified that scrap wood was present on the front
yard:

"In the front yard there were lumber —

specific items

that are listed in that section of the ordinance" (Tr. at 9);
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"There were lumber and other debris.
s^

He had things that. I would

"- -* ;v^ i ng t] : ash that I would remove from the vlot, but I

ao noc recall the specifics7' (Tr. at 24)
Despite the above statements specifically referring to
scrap wood, Defendants object to officei: Mo] ] : y ' s i i 1 abi 1 i I::y I :
recall g r e a t e r s p e c i f i c s .

:a:::, o f f i c e r M o l l o y ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n

o f s c r ap 1 urribe i: :i i i 11 ie f
c o n v i c t i o n for a v i o l a t i o n of
ma^^r • ••=

§ 1 4 . 3 4 . u 8 0 : ; . A f t e r a l l , scrap

• - • "'] y 1 i sted a s a p r o h i b i t e d item.

Plaintiff's
itemized

.-' -

m

:,,.ch cases can h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d

lists of t r a s h and ^unk down

wrapper.

NonetheieLo,

in t:ie m s t a n L

to

produce

to the last: Tvir.kie
casef

t e s t i m o n y w a s no4" 1-nited to scrap w o o d .

officer

^ ^ ^

s

• -ic; , e f f i c e r

Molloy

tes tif:i e :i a s t :
(Tr.

at 2 4 ) , " t r a s h "

m a t e r i a]
51)

:r . at 24

, "-junk"

(T i:

at

,

T <-- -

, "scrap

- - --

' :i :

-. z

M o s t of t h e aoove items are s p e c i f i c a l l y m e n t i o n e d in t h e
A s such, o f f i c e r M o l l o y f s t e s t i m o n y , as b e l i e v e d b y

ordinance.

the c o u r t , w a s m o r e than sufficient in a n d of i t s e l f to w a r r a n t
conviction.

c o r r o b o r a t e d b y D e f e n d a n t s ' only w i t n e s s , B r e n t K e l l e r .
b e i n g qu e s t i o n e d 1 : ] , D e f e n d a n 1: s, 1 1 i

While

I : • = .1 ] < E; I: : f f e r e d 11 > : I: : ] ] : > «

The n e i g h b o r h o o d -- quite frankly, i t ' s n o t a
n e i g h b o r h o o d I w o u l d like "~ 'iv- A n . There a r e

numerous trailers with junk in them, there are
yards with piles of rock and debris. One house in
particular stands out as I went through the
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's
a carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the
ceiling. I couldn't even — I imagine there were
many dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is
about four houses down from the Patton residence.
A house not to far away, a log house, the
front yard is full of weeds. Many houses in the
area are very similar. It's an older
neighborhood, the houses aren't well kept, the
yard aren't well kept, they are not the immaculate
yards that I see in many of the other parts of
Provo. That's how I's describe the neighborhood.
Q.
Is there a substantial difference
between the defendant's property and the rest
of the neighborhood?
A.
Not that I noticed . . .
(Tr. at 93-94).
Apparently this testimony was offered in an attempt to show
discriminatory enforcement of the zoning ordinances.

According

to Defense Counsel: "Our position is that it's an arbitrary
(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being singled out
for no apparent reason . . ." (Tr. at 96). This claim was
summarily rejected by the Court (Tr. at 97-98).

In fact, officer

Molloy testified that Defendants' were not the only ones on the
street charged with zoning violations (Tr. at 55). Further,
officer Molloy testified the instant charges were precipitated by
"several calls from concerned residents in regards to your
property" (Tr. at 56-57).
Obviously, Mr. Keller's testimony was relied upon heavily by
the trial court in deciding to convict (Tr. at 115). At

13

sentencing, the judge reiterated:
You folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for
you as your witness, and Mr. Keller described the
condition of the your property at the time in
question, who was your witness, as being an
eyesore. It was a terrible neighborhood, he said,
and yours — and the condition of your property
was consistent with the way things look in
general, it was bad. I mean he painted a picture
for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not
acceptable.
(Sentencing Transcript at 16-17).
As pointed out in Defendants' brief, a number of factors
must be considered in determining whether a witness' testimony is
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal Defendants' Brief at
13).

Among those included are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The importance of the witness to the prosecution's case;
Whether the testimony is cumulative;
The presence or absence of corroborating or
contradicting testimony;
The extent of cross examination; and
The overall strength of the case.

(Defendants' Brief at 13)(citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898,
902 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987) .
In light of the facts present in this case, analysis of the
above factors weighs in favor of affirming Defendants'
conviction.

First, it has been clearly established that

sufficient evidence existed to warrant a conviction even without
the testimony of Mr. Gonzalez.
largely cumulative.

The testimony of Mr. Gonzalez was

The thrust of Mr. Gonzalez's testimony

merely confirmed the existence of the "debris of wood and lumber

14

scraps that were laying around throughout the vicinity of the
yard. . ." (Tr. at 68).
The next factor to be considered is the presence or absence
of corroborating or contradicting testimony.

Defendants failed

to introduce a scintilla of testimony that contradicted either
the testimony of officer Molloy or officer Gonzalez.

On the

contrary, testimony from Defendants' only witness actually
corroborated testimony offered by the prosecution witnesses.
Another factor to be considered is the extent of cross
examination.

Although Mr. Gonzalez was subjected to cross

examination by Defendant's counsel, it is claimed that "[c]ross
examination was limited by the element of surprise . . ."
(Defendants' Brief at 13). This claim is severely undermined by
the simple fact that Mr. Gonzalez only testified as to the
condition of Defendants' property on March 19, 1996.
testimony hardly constitutes sandbagging.

Such

Surely, Defendants and

counsel were adequately prepared to discuss the condition of the
property on the very day of the charged offense.
Finally, the overall strength of the case must be
considered.

The prosecution's case was supported by every single

witness presented to the trial court.

Defendants failed to offer

a single word of testimony in contradiction.

While the

prosecution offered specific testimony that the yard was out of
compliance on the day in question, Defendants were relegated to
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claiming discriminatory enforcement (Tr. at 96) and contesting
the Constitutionality of the zoning ordinance.

(Tr. ,at 110). In

accordance with this stratagem, most of the cross examination of
officer Molloy was focused on whether or not the Provo City Code
adequately defines common words such as "junk" and "scrap
material" (Tr. at 47-50).
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
testimony of officer Gonzalez.

Defendants were given full

access

to the entire file in accordance with Plaintiff's open-file
policy.

Defendants should have thus been on notice that officer

Gonzalez was a witness.

Further, even if this court were to

find error in the trial court's decision to allow officer
Gonzalez to testify, his testimony was not sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal.

Based on the foregoing

arguments, Plaintiff moves that Defendants' conviction for
illegal storage of junk in violation of Provo City Code §
14.34.080(3) be affirmed.

Dated this 1 (

day of March, 1998.

Christine M. Petersen
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed to each of the following
this

11

day of March, 1998:
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ADDENDUM

18

basis in the zoning contacts?
A.

I'd work with the zoning ordinance, the

zoning map, other supporting documentation that Utah
County has; building permits, Utah County ownership
records.
Q.

And how long did you work there?

A.

Approximately six months.

Q.

And then from there you've went to -- got

employment with Provo City; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

What type of materials in relation to zoning

do you use on a daily basis for Provo City?
A.
map.

I use the zoning ordinance and the zoning

We have a case file history of previous cases

that we've worked with, also with building permit
records and also the Utah County Recorder's Office
information.
""""^

utti^" T'TOg tke approximate date of when you

came to work for Provo City?
A.

It was in November of 1995.

Q.

At that time when you came to work what

duties were assigned to you?
A.

In our office different areas are assigned

to a specific zoning officer so that we can take care
of specific areas and follow through with those cases.

I was assigned a specific area of Provo City.
Q.

After you were assigned this specific area

what did you do?
A.

I was given several cases, and also we

receive zoning complaints that are called in or people
come into the counter, and we receive from those -that information we proceed to investigate whether
there is any violation, and then I act on that kind of
information.
Q.

Were you given a file concerning the Patton

property?
A.

I was.

Q-.

What were your instructions with that file?

A.

I was informed that I should proceed to go

out into the field and verify that there was still a
continuing violation.

I did that, and there was a

violation in my opinion at the site.
Q.

What violation are you talking about?

A.

Violation of Section 14-34-080, the

accumulation of junk, trash and other materials in the
yard.
Q.

And you say you went to the site?

A.

I did, I went out to the property.

Q.

And what did you do when you arrived there?

A.

I looked around the site to see if there

9

were materials that are specified in Section 14-34-030
in the yard area.

I did not go onto the site, I

viewed the site from the public right-of-way. or the
sidewalk.
Q.

At that point what types of materials did

you see?
A.

I saw numerous materials that I don't recaLl

specifics on.

In the front yard area there were

lumber -- specific items that are listed in that
section of the ordinance.

There was in addition a

trailer in the front yard area that appeared to be
inoperable, which is a violation of the city
ordinance.
I also saw the fence that was on the front
property line, and it was in excess of three feet in
height, which is restricted by the city zoning
ordinance.
Q. rar. Malloy, on what day approximately was
this that you went out to the property for the first
time?
A.

I have here a note that I did go to the sice

and sent the first letter out February 23, 1996.
Q.

So it was sometime around--

A.

Around that date, either that day or the day

before the letter was sent to William and Joan Patton

10

I went to the site.
Q.

Now you indicated you sent a letter.

What

is this letter, and when did the letter go out in
relationship to your visit?
A.

The letter went out on February 23rd.

In

that letter I informed the owners of the property the
information I obtained from the Utah County Recorder's
Office that the office had been contacted regarding a
zoning violation, I had been to the site and verified
the violation was in existence, and requested that
they contact me in order that we can gain compliance
for the zoning ordinance (inaudible).
Q.

To whom was this letter sent?

A.

It was to William and Joan Patton.

Q.

And why did you send a letter to William and

Joan Pattoii?
A.

in some situations our office will contact

the. people physically at the site.

In this situation

I decided not to, since there is a notice posted on
the fence to all local and federal agents to not enter
the property.
Q.

And so is that the reason you didn't attempt

to make personal contact?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

What did the letter^contain?

What did you

13

March llth I actually did receive a letter from Joan
Patton.

Different issues were addressed in the

letter, but at no time did I receive the opinion they
were willing to comply with the city zoning ordinance.
THE COURT:

What was the date of the letter?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That was March 11, 1996.

Thank you.

MR. MCGINN:
to do these?

Your Honor, how would you like

Do you want these marked individually,

or group them together as A-THE COURT:
cetera.

No, just mark them 1, 2, 3 et

How many do you have?
MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

I don't know.

I have--

Do you have dozens or have you

| got a few?
1

MR. MCGINN:
THE COURT:

I've got approximately 10.
Okay, mark them that way.

WR> MCGINN:

Okay.

MR. MCGINN:

Your Honor, I have shown these

photographs to counsel.
THE COURT:

May I approach the witness?

You may.

Have you shown them to

Ms. Patton?

Q.

MR. MCGINN:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

BY MR. MCGINN:

Mr. Malloy, would you take a

1

here today when you're testifying, would you please

2

just refer all your comments to the violation that

3

exists on this lot, and violations on any other lot

4

will be saved for another day?

5

A.

I will.

6

Q.

Thank you, would you please take the stand

7

again,

8

(Witness resumes stand)

9

Now the lot at 1067 North 750 West, as what

10

you've

described on the board, showing a residence and

11

a parking pad, correct?

12

A.

It is.

13

Q.

In that front yard area what types of

14

materials did you see on that day that you felt were a

15

violation of 14-34-080?

16

A.

I do not recall specifics, but there were

17

numerous violations on that lot.

18

trmbimr

19

violation when you first look at the lot.

20
21
22

In addition to the

that is the most obvious or most apparent

Q.

Do you remember in general what cypes of

materials were on that?
A.

There were lumber and other debri,s. He had

23

J things that I would see as just being_trash that I

24

would remove from a lot, but I do not recall the

25

specifics.

Mr. Humiston?
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HUMISTON:
Q.

Mr. Malloy, starting from your most recent

testimony, I understand that you say that you have
received citizen complaints?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

You have personally received citizen

complaints from neighbors?
A.

I have spoken with neighbors or people who

say they are neighbors during the process of this
case, that is correct.
Q.

Did you initiate the contact with those

neighbors?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Have those complaints come in before or

after we've last met at this court (inaudible)
F^femary (inaudible)?
A.

I have received contact prior to that date

and since that date with questions regarding what was
going to happen, and that the yard is in -- needs some
attention.
Q.

Is it not true that you stated at that time

in February that there had in fact been no citizen
complaints?
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property in December of 1994. The question is whether
or not the property was in violation on March 19,
1996.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:
Q.

May I approach?

You bet, you sure may.

BY MS. PATTON:

I would like to ask what the

condition of the properties in the neighborhood that
the defendant resides in, as you would have possibly
seen this morning?
A.

The neighborhood -- quite frankly, it's not

a neighborhood I would like to live in. There are
numerous trailers with junk in them, there are yards
with piles of rocks and debris.

One house in

particular stands out as I went through the
neighborhood last Friday and again today, there's a
carport full of cardboard boxes clear up to the
ceiling.

I couldn't even -- I imagine there were many

dozens of these cardboard boxes, which is about four
houses down ftrem the Patton residence.
A house not too far away, a log house, the
front yard is full of weeds.
are very similar.

Many houses in the area

It's an older neighborhood, the

houses aren't well kept, the yards aren't well kept,
they are not immaculate yards that I see in many of
the other parts of Provo.

That's how I'd describe the

94

neighborhood.
Q.

Is there a substantial difference between

the defendant's property and the rest of the
neighborhood?
A.

Not that I noticed, not unless you go out

probably two blocks away to where a brand new
apartment - - a large apartment complex has been built,
and there the yards are very nice, the lawn is cut,
watered regularly, looks quite nice, but once you get
past that the houses, in my opinion, are not that
different.
MS. PATTON:

Just one moment, your Honor.

Your Honor, I've never done this before, so may I
approach Mr. Keller?
THE COURT:

Let's have any photographs

you've got marked as exhibits.

You want to tell me

when they were taken?
MS. PATTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, tell me when they were

MS. PATTON:

Today, although the camera says

taken.

(inaudible).
THE COURT:
photos taken today?
MS. PATTON:

Can you tell me the relevancy of
If you've cleaned it all up-This isn't mine, this is--

1

the City is working on those.

2

the relevance.

3
4

MR. HUMISTON:

I just don't understand

May I speak to that, your

Honor?

5

THE COURT: Sure.

6

MR. HUMISTON:

In Ms. Patton7s cross

7

examination of Mr. Malloy, there was substantial

8

testimony that a lot of these determinations are

9

subjective.

We're dealing here basically with an

10

administrative agent, Mr. Malloy, who makes subjective

11

determinations.

12

Our position is that it's an arbitrary

13

(inaudible) that Mrs. Patton and Mr. Patton are being

14

singled out for no apparent reason, and this gees to

15

the fact that this testimony would -- this evidence

16

would (inaudible) numerous violations.

17

As far as whether any of these specific ones

18

J are being prosecuted, we would find that if Mr. Malloy

19

! cares to testify to that, but we're not aware of any.

20

We are --we think it's significant that there are

21

numerous trailers on the street, numerous trailers

22

that have been parked there for a long time, and as

23

far as you can tell, the trailer seems to be the sole

24

issue at this point.

25

MR. MCGINN:

Objection to that.

We're not

1

talking about any trailer on the street.

2

talking about perhaps an inoperable vehicle in the

3

front yard, or -- and/or we're talking about garbage,

4

trash, junk, those types of materials in the front

5

yard.

6

about trailers in the streets, whether people have

7

things parked--

8
9

We're

That's what we're here about, we're not here

MR. HUMISTON:

Maybe we're arguing semantics

here, but by on the street I mean other neighbors on

10

the street, there are trailers in driveways, trailers

11

in yards, junk in front of houses.

12

of all of that, and we are curious as to why the

13

Pattons are being singled out when I think evidence

14

would show, relative to some of these other houses,

15
16

We have evidence

j it's actually quite a bit cleaner.
MR. MCGINN:

My contention is that there has

17

been no showing of any evidence anywhere that the

18

Pattons have been singled out.

In cross examination I

19

I thought Officer Malloy said yes, there are other

20

violations in the area that they're working on.

21

THE COURT:

I don't have any evidence of

22

discriminatory enforcement of the Provo City

23

Ordinances.

24

neighbornood and that the defendant's property

25

complies with the junky neighborhood, making it junky,

The fact that we may have a junky
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too, doesn't tell me that that's discriminatory
enforcement of the ordinance as to the defendants.
So we've got the testimony from this
gentleman concerning what he's observed in the
neighborhood, and that the defendants' property looks
about the same as everybody else.

I don't think we

need anything else with respect to neighborhood
description.
Count I sets forth the claimed violations of
the defendants with respect to 14-34-080, and that's
what we're -- we are going to proceed under that or
we're not in terms of any finding of violation or no
violation.
MR. HUMISTON:
THE COURT:

So are you sustaining the--

I'm sustaining the objection to

the marking of photographs as exhibits to support the
witness' testimony as to what the neighborhood looked
like.

That's what you wanted to do with them, that's

what she said.
MR. HUMISTON: Yes.
THE COURT:

Mrs. Patton, are you through

with this gentleman?
MS. PATTON:

I have no further questions for

the witness as this time, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

110

that in that neighborhood there are many houses with
trash, garbage and other materials, and said that the
Pattons' home fit the same pattern.
There were three witnesses, all three
witnesses testified that there is trash and garbage in
the yard, and two witnesses testified specifically
that on March 19, 1996 there was trash and garbage.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Patton?
MS. PATTON:

For purposes of appeal, your

Honor, I would like to have noted for the record my
objection that both ordinances under Count I and II
are arbitrary and (inaudible).
THE COURT:
MS. PATTON:
THE COURT:

Well, Count II is dismissed.
Okay, then Count I.
Your objection is noted for the

record, thank you.
MS. PATTON:

Both ordinances under Count I

violate the equal protection clause of the Utah
Constitution under the 14th Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution.
The prosecution has failed to prove that I
have had the criminal intent necessary to violate the
ordinances.

If I lack the substantial understanding

1

anything else that you folks have.

2

and then I'll come back to you.

3

MR. HUMISTON:

4

I'll let him speak

I'd just assume he speak

first, if that's all right.

5

THE COURT:

6

question.

All right.

Now let's go to my

What do we have by way of compliance, and

7

I what request does the City have by way of sentencing?

8

1

9

MR. MCGINN:

Yes, your Honor.

As far as

compliance, in the first case we had two charges, and

10 • we dismissed the (inaudible) case, as the Court will
11

remember, because the problem where we have actually

12

two lots rather than just the one, and we were

13

focusing on 1067.

14 (
15

THE COURT:

Count I was the one that had tne

conviction on it.

16

MR. MCGINN:

17 | address the one lot.

Yes, and therefore we will just
Your Honor, this, as my

13

understanding is now, and the zoning officer can

19

verify this, is the last time he wenc by that the

20

I problem with the storage of trash and junk materials

21

in the front yard has been taken care of?

22 J

MR. MALLOY:

Correct.

23

MR. MCGINN:

At this point it has been taken

I

24

care of.

Your Honor, however in the past, there -~

25

this is the third case that we've had in court now

9

with this same issue on just the garbage'and junk.
Now there are other zoning violations out there, but I
believe the Court indicated we should only be talking
about the junk today.
In 1990 there was a conviction to trash
storage in an open area, and the improper storage.
Judge Dimmick at that time gave a fine of $20 0 and 3 0
days in jail suspended it all upon compliance, being
cleaned up.

At one point it was cleaned up, then

again it became dirty and junky.
We've had another trial, this time from
Judge Hansen in November of 1993.

At that time Judge

Hansen again heard evidence and found the defendant
guilty.
At that time he imposed a sentence of $1,030
fine, 18 0 days in jail, again suspended everything,
pursuant to a one year probationary period in which
the defendant was to clean it up.
At that time as probation was draxving to a
close, the City attempted to 'file an order to show
cause to indicate that the problem was still there.
The Court held a hearing, and in the end of 1995 the
term then (inaudible) the Court's jurisdiction had
expired, that the notice for the order to show cause
had not been filed in a timely matter and notice was

10

not given to the defendant, and therefore the Court
could not extend the probation.
So at that time is when the zoning officer
was given a file to go out and follow up on this, and
that brings us to where we are here today.
Your Honor, yes, it is clean at this time,
but as you can see with the previous cases, it's a
problem that it gets cleaned up, and then it happens
again, and we have a cycle of cleaning up and it's
not -- apparently not cleaned voluntarily, but it
requires the City to file some sort of action and go
in, and in the first case, even require to the point
where the City had to go in and clean it up itself.
THE COURT:

You'll have an opportunity, Ms.

MR. MCGINN:

Based on that, your Honor, we

Patton.

would -- what the City is looking for is compliance in
these cases.

We don't want to see any people

necessarily fined a lot of money or spend time in jail
over something like this.

We want to have a

neighborhood and community that people are proud of,
and we want it — we believe that the zoning laws are
there for a good reason.
In this case, unfortunately, we don't have a
whole lot of voluntarily compliance.

It's taken up a

1

piece of it ended up at the dump.

2

high quality tools and equipment that was taken

3

directly out of the carport and there were witnesses

4

to the fact that it all ended up in the garages and

5

It was all very

I carports of the city workers who took it.

6

That's a fairly drastic punishment that's

7

already been imposed on prior occasions, and in light:

8

of that and, as I say, the Court's feeling that we've

9

been here before.

I feel that those things have been

10

paid for as far as penalties sought by the City.

11

one should be addressed under its own merits.

12

City has said straight up that they wanted compliance

13

and they have obtained compliance.

14

beyond that basically amounts to overkill.

15

I

THE COURT:

Thank you.

This

The

Anything further

Ms. Patton, and

16

gentlemen, when I wrote on this pad I have no

17

intention to babysit you folks, that's really what I

18

feel.

19

City running out to your home every 90 days and

20

sending a report back to this Court to see if you've

21

kept things like you should have.

22

I don't --by that, I'm not interested in the

You're adults, you ought to know by now

23

what's acceptable and what's not acceptable.

You

24

folks called a Mr. Keller to testify for you as your

25

witness, and Mr. Keller described the condition of

17

your property at the time in question, who was your
witness, as being an eyesore.

It was a terrible

neighborhood, he said, and yours -- and the condition
of your property was consistent with the way things
look in general, it was bad.

I mean he painted a

picture for me that wasn't very pretty, certainly not
acceptable.
So my attitude is this.

You've been found

guilty of Count I, you've cleaned up the property
which is now acceptable to the City and the zoning
requirement, and that's what I'm interested in.
I'm going to impose the following sentence.
With respect to Count I, a class B misdemeanor as to
Joan Patton, I'm going to impose a sentence of $500
and 3 0 days in Utah County Jail.
I will suspend all of the fine and all of
the time on the condition that the property remains in
an acceptable condition, no further violation of the
City for one year.
With respect to the case of Provo City vs.
William Patton, I'm going to impose the same fine and
the same penalty with respect to time, and will not -will stay the execution of both the sentence and the
fine on the condition that the property remains in the
condition it is now for a period of one year.

